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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Chevalier case does not set forth a policy that full per-
formance will never withdraw a personal service contract from
the Statute, it merely qualifies the rule adopted by the American
Law Institute" in order to assure that the statute of frauds will
be applied to accomplish its purpose, unless the performance is
evidence of the existence of the alleged contract. This will go
far to prevent fraudulent claims under a nonexistent contract, and
at the same time will rarely result in any great hardship on em-
ployees because in most cases the performance will refer to the
alleged contract. For these reasons it seems unlikely that the Court
will fulfill Justice Simpson's desire that Paschall v. Anderson be
overruled. At least no such intent was shown by the Court when it
stated that: "A view contrary to Paschall v. Anderson has, it is
true, been taken by some authorities such as the American Law
Institute..., but we nevertheless regard the case as sound on
principal within its self-imposed limits.""
Joe L.Randle.
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS IN PROPERTY OF DEBTORS
SUBJECT TO PRIOR UNRECORDED CONVEYANCES
T HE Texas recording statute states that "all ... conveyances
... of any land.., and all deeds of trust and mortgages shall
be void as to all creditors .. unless they shall be acknowledged
or proved and filed with the clerk, to be recorded as required by
law";' and the Texas statute of conveyances provides that convey-
ances of land "shall not be good and effectual ... against any
creditor, unless such conveyance" shall have been recorded as
required by law.' (Italics supplied.) Questions have frequently
so RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 198 Illustration 9 (1932).
z'.Tex. _ 213 S. W. (2d) 530, 533 (1948).
1 TFx. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 6627.
2 Id. Art. 1289.
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arisen in the courts as to the meaning of the word "creditors" in
these statutes with respect to property of debtors subject to prior
unrecorded conveyances.
If the language of the statutes were applied literally, unrecorded
prior conveyances of a debtor would be void as to his creditors
irrespective of whether they had reduced their claims to judg-
ment, had recorded their abstracts of judgment, or had levied upon
the land. It was early established in Texas, however, that the word
"creditors" as used in these statutes, refers only to "lien credi-
tors." In Grace v. Wade' the Supreme Court stated:
"It is scarcely necessary to say that our courts, like those of other
states where statutes on this subject extend to creditors, have held that
they only apply to and protect creditors who have acquired some char-
acter of lien upon or interest in the land."'4
This construction of the statutes has been consistently followed
and applied by the courts.
Texas statutes relating to the recording of abstracts of judg-
ment provide that judgments which have been recorded and in-
dexed shall, from the date of such record and index, "operate as a
lien upon all of the real estate of the defendant situated in the
county where such record and index are made, and upon all real
estate which the defendant may thereafter acquire, situated in said
county."' The question has arisen whether the recording of an
abstract of judgment would have the effect of giving the creditor
such lien on the property of the debtor as would defeat the rights
of a prior grantee of the debtor who had failed to record. In
Hooker v. Eaken,6 decided by the Court of Civil Appeals, the
conveyance was made by the debtor prior to judgment obtained by
the creditor, and the deed was recorded after rendition and record-
ing of the judgment but prior to levy upon the property. The Court
3 Grace v. Wade, 45 Tex. 522 (1876).
4 Linn v. Le Compte, 47 Tex. 440 (1877) ; See 36 TEx. Jon. I 97 (1935).
5TEx. REv. CMv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925), Art. 5449.
6 Hooker v. Eaken, 176 S. W. 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) writ of error refused.
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held that, notwithstanding the abstract of judgment statute, the
grantees's rights in the property were superior to those of the judg-
ment creditor. The Court pointed out that the statute gave the
judgment creditor a lien only upon real estate then owned or after-
wards acquired by the judgment debtor, that at the time the
abstract of judgment was recorded the debtor, by reason of his
prior conveyance, even though unrecorded, did not actually own
the land, and that the judgment creditor could not, therefore,
obtain a lien upon such land merely by recording his abstract of
judgment. The Supreme Court adopted the rule of this case in
Lewis v. San Antonio Belt and Terminal Ry.,7 and declared that
the rights of the grantee, whose deed is unrecorded, are superior to
a subsequent judgment creditor who has recorded his abstract of
judgment because the rights of such grantee are beyond the "con-
templation of the statutes of registration respecting creditors."' In
both of these cases the courts stated by way of dictum that if the
judgment creditor had actually levied execution on the property
without actual or constructive notice of the prior conveyance, he
would have prevailed over the grantee, because upon the levy a
lien in favor of the creditor would have arisen, which lien would
be given the protection of the recording statutes. Under the rule
of these cases, therefore, judgment creditors may protect them-
selves against the possibility of prior unrecorded conveyances of
their debtors only by levying execution upon specific property of
the judgment debtor and not by mere recordation of the abstract of
judgment. If the conveyance was made after the recording of the
abstract of judgment, the judgment creditor would, of course, pre-
vail under the general provisions of the statutes pertaining to the
recording of judgments since, in such event, the property would
actually have been owned by the debtor at the time the judgment
was recorded.'
7 Lewis v. San Antonio Belt and Terminal Ry., 208 S. W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919)
writ of error refused.
8 Id. at 553.
9 Baler v. West, 36 S. W. (2d) 695, 120 Tex. 113 (1914); See 36 TEr_ JuRL § 96
(1935).
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A collateral point is whether the recording of the prior convey-
ance after levy but prior to sale will defeat the title of the pur-
chaser at the sheriff's sale. A 1948 decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals answered this question in the negative. ° When a judgment
creditor levies execution upon the property, the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale obtains a title which is superior to that of a third
person who held under an unrecorded deed at the time of the levy,
and it makes no difference whether the purchaser at the sale had
actual notice of the unrecorded deed or had constructive notice
(deed recorded after lien attached), because the purchaser obtains
the rights of the lien creditor. Unrecorded conveyances are void
as to all lien creditors and therefore the lien creditor has the right
to have the property sold in satisfaction of his judgment irrespec-
tive of the knowledge acquired after levy of prior unrecorded con-
veyances of the property made by the judgment debtor.
Judicial construction of the Texas conveyance, recording, and
abstract of judgment statutes leads to the following conclusions:
(a) The only creditors protected against prior unrecorded con-
veyances of their debtors are lien creditors.
(b) The recording of an abstract of judgment does not pro-
tect a judgment creditor against prior unrecorded conveyances of
debtor.
(c) The levy of execution by a judgment creditor upon prop-
erty of his debtor will enable the judgment creditor to prevail
against prior unrecorded conveyances of the property by his
debtor-
(d) A prior conveyance of a debtor, recorded after levy of
execution by a judgment creditor, but before the sheriff's sale,
will not defeat the superior lien of the judgment creditor acquired
by levy upon the property.
Since a judgment creditor may not rely upon the recording of
his abstract of judgment to protect himself against the possibility
of prior unrecorded conveyances made by his debtor, he should
[Vol. 3
